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ComputingAmerica

About

A software firm built around the part most firms outsource.

Founded in 2026 on a straightforward premise: mid-market and public-sector organizations deserve the same engineering quality that venture-backed software companies buy, and they can have it, if the people building it are senior and in the same time zone.

To a plan you could hand to another firm
2–4 weeksTo a plan you could hand to another firmFixed-fee discovery, artifacts yours either way
Notice to cancel, any reason
30 daysNotice to cancel, any reasonNo minimum term after the first release

Why we exist

The gap we started in.

There is a category of company (a few hundred to a few thousand people, running something physical or regulated or both) that cannot buy its way out of its software problem. The off-the-shelf platforms are built for a generic version of their process. The large consultancies price them out or staff them with people three years into a career. The offshore option looks cheap until you count the rework and the round trips.

We built the firm for that gap. Small teams of experienced engineers, all in the United States, working directly with the people who do the work rather than through three layers of account management. No bench of juniors to keep busy, and therefore no incentive to make projects larger than they need to be.

That choice has a cost. We lose price-led competitions routinely, and we turn down work in sectors we don’t know. What we get in return is the thing that actually compounds: clients who call us back for the second system, and engineers who stay long enough to be genuinely good at this.

What we hold to

Two things we’re willing to lose work over.

The other two we used to print here are on the process page, where they are commitments rather than sentiments: we will tell you not to build it, and you own everything from the first commit.

  • Craft is a business argument

    Tests, documentation and accessibility are not indulgences. They are what makes the fourth year of a system cost less than the first. We treat them as scope, not as extras.

  • Understand the work before changing it

    We go to the warehouse, the plant, the clinic and the truck. Requirements gathered in a conference room describe how people think the work happens.

The bench

Eight disciplines, and the systems that evidence each one.

There is no separate sales organization to hand you off from. The person who scopes the engagement is on it, and most engagements draw on more than one of these at once.

  • Distributed state
  • Compilers and language tooling
  • Operational technology security
  • Vulnerability research
  • Applied machine learning
  • Embedded and hardware interfaces
  • Concurrency
  • Geometry and optimization

Each of these is published with something built against it — a compiler front to back, a sharded store on consensus, a detector that finds a changed controller without a signature — and each one carries a written note saying what it is not. That is a harder claim to make than a biography, and it is the one worth reading.

Research

Some of what we know, we found out the hard way.

Peer-reviewed and presented work by people on staff, mostly in industrial control security. We cite it because it is checkable, which is the only kind of credential worth putting on a page.

  • IEEE CARS · GCRI

    Anomaly detection in ICS networks with fuzzy hashing

    Similarity-preserving hashes applied to control-network traffic, validated on a multi-vendor PLC bench.

  • RST CON

    Securing interconnected IT and OT systems

    Exploitation and defense of programmable logic controllers across the enterprise boundary.

  • ERAU · NASA · NSF Aero-Cyber

    Anomaly detection for satellite hardware tampering

    Hardware-level tamper indicators on systems that cannot be physically inspected after deployment.

  • NSF INSuRE+E

    SCADA security in interconnected IT and OT environments

    Denial of service, man in the middle and packet manipulation against ladder-logic-driven PLCs.

  • Los Alamos · Idaho National Laboratory

    Presented operational technology research

    Findings reviewed by laboratory researchers, which is a harder audience than an internal report gets.

  • In review

    Automated code vulnerability detection using synthetic training data

    Plus reverse engineering of FPGA bitstreams, and applied vision and audio detection research.

Credentials & assurance

Procurement questions, answered before you ask.

Certifications and completed training held by engineers on staff, and the standards we build to. Each row says which of the three it is. What we will and won’t sign up to contractually is set out on the process page, in advance of anyone sending paper.

Certification

CompTIA Security+
Held on staff, DoD 8570 baseline

Certification

CompTIA PenTest+
Held on staff, offensive security practice

Certification

GIAC GFACT
Foundational cybersecurity technologies

Completed training

Red Hat RH124
Course completion, system administration; plus academy instruction

Completed training

CISA ICS 301V / 100W
Course completions, industrial control systems cybersecurity

Completed training

TEEX DHS-certified
DHS-certified course completions: digital forensics, incident response, network assurance, IoT

Standard we build to

NIST 800-171
Aligned controls for CUI handling; not a credential we hold

Standard we build to

WCAG 2.2 AA
Conformance target on every interface we ship; not a credential we hold

Next step

Tell us what’s breaking.

Forty-five minutes, no charge, no deck. We’ll tell you what we’d do, what it would likely cost, and whether you should be building this at all.